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Abstract—We consider theoretical limits of partial se-
crecy in a setting where an eavesdropper attempts to
causally reconstruct an information sequence with low
distortion based on an intercepted transmission and the
past of the sequence. The transmitter and receiver have
limited secret key at their disposal but not enough to es-
tablish perfect secrecy with a one-time pad. From another
viewpoint, the eavesdropper is acting as an adversary,
competing in a zero-sum repeated game against the sender
and receiver of the secrecy system. In this case, the
information sequence represents a sequence of actions, and
the distortion function captures the payoff of the game.
We give an information theoretic region expressing the
tradeoff between secret key rate and max-min distortion
for the eavesdropper. We also simplify this characterization
to a linear program. As an example, we discuss how to
optimally use secret key to hide Bernoulli-p bits from
an eavesdropper so that they incur maximal Hamming
distortion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret communication by means of basic ciphers and
steganography has been used since antiquity. By the time
of World War II, mechanical cipher machines such as
Germany’s Enigma brought cryptography to an advanced
level. Cipher systems were designed with secret and
complex construction and often made use of secret keys.
As new systems were being developed, cryptanalysts em-
ployed mathematics and espionage to break the secrecy
of such systems, with substantial success.
The theoretical investigation of secret communication
was formalized by Claude Shannon as a fundamental
component of his broad theory of communication. In
his 1949 paper, “Communication Theory of Secrecy
Systems” [1], Shannon showed among other things that
truly secret communication over a public channel cannot
be achieved with less secret key than is needed for
a Vernam cipher using a one-time pad. The Vernam
cipher utilizes shared secret key to hide the message
via a bit-wise exclusive-or operation. This produces a
transmitted signal that is independent of the message if
the key is an independent sequence of random bits, as
with the one-time pad. To formalize the study of secret
communication, Shannon assumed that an eavesdropper
knows everything about the encryption system except
the secret key. Furthermore, he allowed the eavesdropper
to use unlimited computational resources to break the
encryption. These assumptions lay foundation for strong
statements about secrecy. However, the most famous
result from this work is that perfect secrecy, where
the ciphertext (transmission) reveals nothing about the
plaintext (message), requires a secret key with as much
entropy as the message itself.
Exchanging such large secret keys for perfect secrecy
can be unrealistic. Thus, the field has advanced through
a number of different compromises: computational limits
on the eavesdropper; noisy public channels for commu-
nication; metrics for partial secrecy; etc.
Practical modern applications of cryptography have
been mostly based on secrecy that is computationally
difficult to discover. Diffie and Hellman introduced in
[2] the use of asymmetric keys for cipher systems and
trapdoor functions, which are easy to compute but hard
to invert, to keep the keys secret. Systems of this type
maintain secrecy as long as the trapdoor function is not
inverted for the particular key used. To date, complex-
ity theory has yet to provide certificates of proof that
commonly used encryption systems are computationally
difficult to break. Nevertheless, in practice such systems
have proven extremely useful.
Mathematical proofs of secrecy along the lines of
Shannon have remained an active area of research. Infor-
mation theoretic secrecy may someday be a cost effective
and desirable framework for encryption if an inexpensive
method for secret key exchange is developed, which
may come about through the use of quantum channels
as pioneered by Bennett and Brassard [3]. Additionally,
quantum computing may bring security risks to the
state-of-the-art cryptographic systems that don’t provide
information theoretic secrecy. However, perhaps more
importantly, the study of information theoretic secrecy
builds a foundation of precise problems, with answers
that provide important insights into the nature of secret
communication. These insights may be used to shape
the development of practical systems for encryption in
complex settings.
Since Shannon, various settings have been explored.
The wire-tap channel is a setting introduced by Wyner
[4], where the intended receiver and an eavesdropper
each get different noisy versions of the transmitted
signal. If the eavesdropper has a noisier view of the
signal than the intended receiver, then perfect secrecy
can be achieved without the use of a secret key, although
a low rate of communication might be required. This has
inspired related work on physical layer security. Some
settings allow for correlated (but not identically equal)
measurements to be made by the various participants in
consideration, from which they can derive a secret key
or make inferences about the information source. See,
for example, [5].
Even in the simplest of settings, a general theory
of secrecy must address partial secrecy. The following
section discusses this topic, which is the focus of this
work.
II. PARTIAL SECRECY
Most work on information theoretic security, including
Shannon’s [1] and Wyner’s [4], address the concept
of imperfect or partial secrecy. A widely used metric
of partial secrecy is equivocation. The term “equivo-
cation” was used in an information theory context as
early as Shannon’s 1948 paper [6]. In the process of
communicating through a noisy channel, the receiver of
the communication may be confused (due to the noise)
as to which signal was actually transmitted. The goal
of a reliable communication system is to remove the
confusion. For the purpose of providing an intuitive
illustration, Shannon considered the analog transmission
of a random information signal over a noisy channel.
The result is equivocation, in the English language sense
of the word. Because of the noise, the receiver cannot
uniquely identify the meaning of the information, which
is the source sequence that was transmitted. Shannon
quantified equivocation as the conditional entropy of the
source sequence Xn given the output of the channel Y n.
In a secrecy system, equivocation of the information
signal with respect to the eavesdropper’s knowledge is
a desirable outcome. Let E represent everything that the
eavesdropper knows. If perfect secrecy is achieved, then
the eavesdropper’s knowledge, E , is independent of the
information, Xn. In this case, the equivocation H(Xn|E)
is equal to its upper bound of H(Xn). On the other hand,
if the equivocation is zero, then the eavesdropper knows
the information perfectly. Consequently, equivocation
has been adopted repeatedly as a measurement of partial
secrecy. It is also a nice quantity to deal with for
information theorists. In a variety of work, including for
example [5], the greatest possible equivocation is sought
under the communication and secret key constraints.
Shannon referred extensively to equivocation in his
landmark secrecy paper [1]. He outlined the properties of
equivocation that make it an intuitive and useful quantity
to deal with. However, the mathematical use of equivoca-
tion in his work served as an intermediate mechanism for
determining how long a cipher can be used before it can
be cracked with reasonable certainty. In his setting, the
roughly linear relationship between the equivocation of
the secret key and the length of the ciphertext made the
analysis of equivocation a useful avenue to the results.
The paper does not use equivocation as a metric of partial
secrecy.
Equivocation is not a thoroughly motivated measure-
ment for partial secrecy, but it does have some interesting
consequences and properties. For example, equivocation
of a message implies a lower bound on the size of a
list that an eavesdropper can reliably limit the message
to. If the eavesdropper has some other description of the
information to supplement the intercepted transmission,
he might be able to deduce the information in spite of
the encryption, but the amount of additional information
must be at least as great as the equivocation created by
the encryption system. In the setting of [1], the extra side
information comes implicitly from the redundancy of the
information source, and hence the ability to compress.
For instance, if an eavesdropper is aware of a compres-
sion algorithm that is more efficient than the compression
used by the encoder in an encryption system, then he can
use this ability to rule out unlikely sequences from the
information source. This would be like an eavesdropper
intercepting a partially encrypted video sequence and
decoding a (exponentially large) list of candidate videos.
If the eavesdropper then painstakingly watches each
video in the list, most will be ruled out as garbage.
The redundancy of the source effectively provides side
information to the eavesdropper.
Other approaches for measuring and maximizing par-
tial secrecy have been explored. In the work of Merhav
[7], secrecy is measured by the probability that an
eavesdropper can guess the message correctly. This uses
large deviations analysis to evaluate and minimize that
probability. Under perfect secrecy, the probability that
an eavesdropper guesses an i.i.d. information sequence
correctly goes exponentially to zero. In a different ap-
proach, Maurer [8] suggested a combination of compu-
tational and information theoretic secrecy. He proposed
an encryption scheme that uses very little secret key and
a very long public random sequence. The secret key
selects parts of the random sequence to combine and
use as a one-time pad. Assuming that the eavesdrop-
per cannot reasonably explore all parts of the random
sequence, a high probability event yields the message
and the transmission conditionally independent. Thus,
with an assumed computational limit, the system yields
conditionally-perfect secrecy with high probability.
We take a different approach to partial secrecy. Just as
rate-distortion theory generalizes lossless compression,
we can generalize lossless encryption by assigning a
distortion function to the eavesdropper. Suppose the
eavesdropper attempts to reconstruct the data. We don’t
care whether the eavesdropper reconstructed the exact
sequence, but instead we care about the average dis-
tortion that the eavesdropper incurred. In the simplest
case, which we confine ourselves to in this work, we
require the intended receiver to decode the information
losslessly (with high probability) and attempt to force
the eavesdropper to have a poor reconstruction of the
data.
Our work is similar in ambition to Yamamoto’s ap-
proach in [9]. He also assigned a distortion function to
the eavesdropper. However, the related bounds presented
in that paper miss a crucial point. It turns out that it
is too easy to force the eavesdropper to have a poor
reconstruction. With only a trickle of secret key at any
positive rate, the eavesdropper will reconstruct as poorly
as if there was perfect secrecy. This result will not
be proven or thoroughly discussed in this paper. But
needless to say, a more interesting notion of partial
secrecy is desired for the sake of a general theory.
In contrast to Yamamoto’s setting, in our work
the eavesdropper is allowed to reconstruct the source
causally, based on the intercepted transmission and the
past information in the sequence, represented mathemat-
ically as
Eavesdropper’s estimate of Xi = Zi(I,Xi−1),
where I is the transmission. In this case, an interesting
notion of partial secrecy emerges. We establish a simple
tradeoff between the rate of secret key and the max-min
distortion that the eavesdropper will incur.
Secrecy is naturally motivated by competitive or
adversarial settings. Here also we find ourselves in
a competitive setting, where an eavesdropper tries to
reconstruct information, and the transmitter does all
within his power to make this difficult. In fact, since
the eavesdropper can see the past information symbols,
and appropriate situation to apply this result is in a
repeated game. The eavesdropper sees the past actions in
the game and dynamically responds with the next action
Zi(I,X
i−1). The distortion function then becomes the
payoff of the zero-sum game.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Let the source {Xi}∞i=1 be an i.i.d. random process
where the distribution of each element of the sequence
Xi is given by the probability mass function p0(x). Let
X be the support of Xi.
An (R0, R, n) code consists of an encoding function
and a decoding function, utilizing a secret key rate of
R0 bits per symbol and a description rate of R bits per
symbol. Specifically,
f : X n × [2nR0 ]→ [2nR],
g : [2nR]× [2nR0 ]→ X n.
The secret key is represented by ω ∼ Unif [2nR0 ].
The message I = f(Xn, ω), and the reconstruction
Xˆn = g(I, ω). The encoder and decoder need not
be deterministic; however, randomized encoding and
decoding is not needed in this setting. The converse part
of the proof in Section V holds even for randomized
encoders and decoders.
A distortion function d(x, z) takes on finite values,
d : X × Z → ℜ.
We say the rate pair (R0, R) can force distortion D
if there exists a sequence of (R0, R, n) codes for n =
1, 2, ... such that
P(Xˆn = Xn) → 1,
1
n
n∑
q=1
min
z(q)(i,xq−1)
E d(Xq, z
(q)(I,Xq−1)) ≥ D.
The rate-distortion triple (R0, R,D) is achievable for
secrecy with lossless transmission if the rate pair (R0, R)
can force distortion D.
Let the secrecy rate-distortion region S be the closure
of achievable (R0, R,D) triples.
IV. MAIN RESULT
The secrecy rate-distortion region S is equal to S0
stated below, as specified in the Theorem 4.1.
Define
S0 ,


(R0, R,D) :
∃ p(x, u) = p0(x)p(u|x)s.t.
R0 ≥ H(X|U),
R ≥ H(X),
D ≤ minz(u)E d(X, z(U)).


.
Theorem 4.1:
S = S0.
Notice that the bound on R does not depend on the
choice of auxiliary variable U . Quite intuitively, the
minimum description rate needed is the entropy rate
of the source H(X). This means that there is not a
tradeoff between secret key usage and communication
over the public channel. The slice of the secrecy rate-
distortion region that corresponds to a fixed value of D
is a rectangular region.
V. CONVERSE
Proof: In this section we prove that S ⊂ S0.
Therefore, we start by assuming that (R0, R,D) is in the
interior of S . In other words, assume that rates (R0, R)
can force distortion D. Now we analyze the sequence of
codes that achieves this. 1
We start by bounding R0 using Fano’s inequality.
nR0 = H(ω)
≥ H(ω|I)
≥ I(Xn;ω|I)
= H(Xn|I)−H(Xn|I, ω)
≥ H(Xn|I)− nǫn
=
n∑
q=1
H(Xq|I,X
q−1)− nǫn
= nH(XQ|I,X
Q−1, Q)− nǫn,
where ǫn goes to zero as n goes to infinity due to Fano’s
inequality, and Q is uniformly distributed on [n] and
independent of Xn.
It is beneficial to assign names to the collections of
random variables to correspond with the definition of S0.
X , XQ,
U , {I,XQ−1, Q}.
Notice that XQ ∼ p0(x) since Q is independent of Xn.
Therefore, to summarize the bound on R0,
R0 ≥ H(X|U)− ǫn.
1The boundary of S is taken care of because S0 is a closed set.
The bound on R is straightforward from lossless
source coding and will be omitted.
Finally, we can massage the definition of achievability
into a bound on the distortion D.
D ≤
1
n
n∑
q=1
min
z(q)(i,xq−1)
E d(Xq, z
(q)(I,Xq−1))
= E
[
min
z(q)(i,xq−1)
E
(
d(XQ, z
(Q)(I,XQ−1))|Q
)]
= min
z(i,xq−1,q)
E d(XQ, z(I,X
Q−1, Q))
= min
z(u)
E d(X, z(U)).
Since ǫn goes to zero and the space of distributions is
compact, the converse is proven.
VI. SKETCH OF ACHIEVABILITY
Proof: In this section we outline the proof that S ⊃
S0. Because we use standard techniques of covering and
binning, the proof only necessitates an outline.
Assume that (R0, R,D) is in the interior of S0, and
consider the validating choice of p(u|x). First use a
communication rate of R1 = I(X;U) + ǫ to specify
the index of a Un sequence from a rate-distortion-like
codebook. We can refer to this as a covering codebook.
Then use rates R2 = R0 = H(X|U) + ǫ bits to send a
randomly assigned bin index based on the sequence Xn
and the common randomness ω. The message I is the
combination of these two communication steps, with a
total rate of R = R1+R2. From standard techniques we
know that Xn can be decoded with high reliability from
I and ω.
The second part of the message, which is the hash
value of the source sequence Xn, has been hidden from
the eavesdropper because the hash value is based on
common randomness equal to the length of the message.
This is essentially an unstructured one-time-pad, and
indeed a standard one-time-pad could very well be used
instead for this part of the communication.
We now refer to the derivations in [10] to claim that
from the point of view of the eavesdropper, who knows
only the sequence Un specified by the encoder, the
posterior distribution of the source Xn is close in total
variation to the output of a memoryless channel from
Un to Xn. In other words,
p(xn|i) ≈
n∏
j=1
p′(xj |uj(i)),
where p′(x|u) = p0(x)p(u|x)∑
x˜
p0(x˜)p(u|x˜)
.
Given this posterior distribution of Xn, the eavesdrop-
per minimizes the distortion by choosing the function
z(u) that minimized E d(X, z(U)) and constructing
the sequence Zi = z(Ui). The resulting distortion is
asymptotically
min
z(u)
E d(X, z(U)).
VII. LINEAR PROGRAM CHARACTERIZATION
The information theoretic region S0 accurately spec-
ifies the secrecy rate-distortion region; however, the
optimization involved in this characterization yields an
even simpler structure. Due to the concave nature of the
entropy function, the only efficient distributions p(x|u)
are corner points in the max-min distortion curve, which
are points for which the eavesdropper can choose sev-
eral different reconstructions z1, z2, ... that each equally
minimize the expected distortion. This is characterized
by the following set of distributions.
P ,
{
p(x) :
∣∣∣argmax
z
E[d(X, z)]
∣∣∣ ≥ |X |} ,
where |X | is the cardinality of the support of X under
the distribution p(x).
As long as d(x, z) is not redundant, meaning that there
do not exist distinct z1 and z2 for which d(x, z1) =
d(x, z2) for all x, then P will be a finite set of points.
We assume this without loss of generality. Let us refer
to the distributions in P as vectors p1, ..., pK , so that
P = {p1, ..., pK}.
Each point in P has an associated entropy
αk , H(pk)
and incurs a minimum distortion
βk , min
z
Epk d(X, z).
Theorem 7.1: The secrecy rate-distortion region can
be characterized with a linear program. Let R = H(X)
and R0 be arbitrary. Define D∗ to be the minimum D
such that (R,R0,D) ∈ S . Then D∗ can be computed
from the following linear program.
maximize µTβ
subject to µ ∈ ℜK+ ,
µTα ≤ R0,
K∑
k=1
µkpk = p(x).
VIII. BINARY SOURCE WITH HAMMING DISTORTION
Consider an information source that is an i.i.d. se-
quence of Bernoulli-p bits (for p < 1/2), with Hamming
distortion incurred by the eavesdropper. The applications
of Theorems 4.1 and 7.1 yield the following communi-
cation tactic. First, use lossy compression to reveal the
location of (1 − 2p) zeros, leaving an equal number of
ones and zeros concealed in the sequence. When done
carefully, the posterior distribution of the concealed bits
will be consistent with unbiased i.i.d. coin flips. Using
the secret key, encrypt as many of these bits as possible.
With this technique, the distortion incurred will be
D = R0/2 for R0 < 2p. Notice that with perfect secrecy,
created by applying a one-time-pad to the entire data at
a secret key rate of R0 = H(p), the distortion incurred
by the eavesdropper is D = p, since the eavesdropper
will construct zi = 0 for all i. We see that with optimal
secret key usage, the full distortion D = p can be forced
on the eavesdropper while only using a secret key rate
of R0 = 2p < H(p). In other words, some reduction
in secret key usage, below the requirement for perfect
secrecy with a one-time pad, goes without penalty in this
framework. Furthermore, were we to use the secret key in
a naive way and hide the first portion of the information
sequence while revealing the rest, the resulting minimum
distortion would be strictly suboptimal.
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